viral_sync

use anchor_lang::prelude::*;use anchor_spl::token_2022::{self, spl_token_2022::{extension::{transfer_hook, PodStateWithExtensions}, pod::PodMint}};use anchor_spl::token_interface::Mint;use crate::errors::ViralSyncError;use crate::state::merchant_config::MerchantConfig; // Phase 1: create_mint_and_config#[derive(Accounts)]pub struct CreateMintAndConfig<'info> {    #[account(        init,        payer = merchant,        space = 8 + 200,         seeds = [b"merchant_v4", mint.key().as_ref()],        bump    )]    pub merchant_config: Account<'info, MerchantConfig>,        #[account(mut)]    pub merchant: Signer<'info>,        // The mint is pre-created with Token-2022 extensions by the deployment runner.    pub mint: InterfaceAccount<'info, Mint>,

1. Line 2 use anchor_spl::token_2022::{self, spl_token_2022::{extension::{transfer_hook, PodStateWit: Targets the Token-2022 program instead of the original Token Program.
2. Line 11 init,: Creates and pays for a new account. Space and payer must be specified.
3. Line 14 seeds = [b"merchant_v4", mint.key().as_ref()],: Declares the PDA seeds. Anchor re-derives the address and rejects the account if it doesn't match.
4. Line 15 bump: Uses the bump seed, the extra byte that pushes the derived address off the ed25519 curve.
5. Line 20 pub merchant: Signer<'info>,: Requires this account to have signed the transaction.

        // Bound the session tightly to prevent infinite authority    require!(expires_at > Clock::get()?.unix_timestamp, ViralSyncError::TokensExpired);         session.bump = ctx.bumps.session_key;    session.authority = ctx.accounts.authority.key();    session.target_generation = gen.key();    session.delegate = ctx.accounts.delegate.key();    session.expires_at = expires_at;    session.max_tokens_per_session = max_tokens_per_session;    session.tokens_spent = 0;    session.is_active = true;        Ok(())} #[derive(Accounts)]pub struct RevokeSessionKey<'info> {    #[account(        mut,         close = authority,         has_one = authority    )]    pub session_key: Account<'info, SessionKey>,

1. Line 39 require!(expires_at > Clock::get()?.unix_timestamp, ViralSyncError::TokensExpired);: An explicit validation that aborts the instruction with an error.
2. Line 39 require!(expires_at > Clock::get()?.unix_timestamp, ViralSyncError::TokensExpired);: Reads on-chain time from the Clock sysvar.
3. Line 41 session.bump = ctx.bumps.session_key;: Uses the bump seed, the extra byte that pushes the derived address off the ed25519 curve.
4. Line 57 close = authority,: Closes the account at the end of the instruction and refunds its lamports.
5. Line 58 has_one = authority: Checks that a stored pubkey field matches the passed account.

    #[account(        mut,        has_one = merchant_authority @ ViralSyncError::AccessDenied,        constraint = merchant_config.status == CausalMerchantStatus::Active @ ViralSyncError::InvalidState,    )]    pub merchant_config: Account<'info, CausalMerchantConfig>,     #[account(mut)]    pub merchant_authority: Signer<'info>,     pub terminal_authority: Signer<'info>,     #[account(        init,        payer = merchant_authority,        space = TerminalDevice::SIZE,        seeds = [            TerminalDevice::SEED_PREFIX,            merchant_config.key().as_ref(),            terminal_authority.key().as_ref(),        ],        bump    )]    pub terminal_device: Account<'info, TerminalDevice>,

1. Line 51 has_one = merchant_authority @ ViralSyncError::AccessDenied,: Checks that a stored pubkey field matches the passed account.
2. Line 57 pub merchant_authority: Signer<'info>,: Requires this account to have signed the transaction.
3. Line 62 init,: Creates and pays for a new account. Space and payer must be specified.
4. Line 65 seeds = [: Declares the PDA seeds. Anchor re-derives the address and rejects the account if it doesn't match.
5. Line 70 bump: Uses the bump seed, the extra byte that pushes the derived address off the ed25519 curve.

    require!(!bond.is_locked, ViralSyncError::InvalidState);    require!(        bond.bonded_lamports.saturating_sub(amount) >= bond.min_required_lamports,        ViralSyncError::InsufficientBalance    );        // Simulate Time Lock Check natively     // require!(Clock::get()?.unix_timestamp > bond.unlock_requested_at + 172800, ViralSyncError::AccessDenied);        bond.bonded_lamports = bond.bonded_lamports.checked_sub(amount).ok_or(ViralSyncError::MathOverflow)?;    // Native sublamports from bond vault to merchant...    Ok(())} #[derive(Accounts)]pub struct InitiateCloseMerchant<'info> {    #[account(mut, has_one = merchant)]    pub merchant_config: Account<'info, MerchantConfig>,        pub merchant: Signer<'info>,} pub fn initiate_close_merchant(ctx: Context<InitiateCloseMerchant>) -> Result<()> {    let config = &mut ctx.accounts.merchant_config;

1. Line 49 require!(!bond.is_locked, ViralSyncError::InvalidState);: An explicit validation that aborts the instruction with an error.
2. Line 56 // require!(Clock::get()?.unix_timestamp > bond.unlock_requested_at + 172800, ViralSyncErr: Reads on-chain time from the Clock sysvar.
3. Line 58 bond.bonded_lamports = bond.bonded_lamports.checked_sub(amount).ok_or(ViralSyncError::Math: Uses checked arithmetic so overflow fails instead of wrapping.
4. Line 65 #[account(mut, has_one = merchant)]: Checks that a stored pubkey field matches the passed account.
5. Line 68 pub merchant: Signer<'info>,: Requires this account to have signed the transaction.